In my SWOSU classrooms this semester, my students and I are in a unique position to look on as the Russian-Ukraine crisis unfolds in real-time.
I am currently teaching a required major course on introductory International Relations and “Theories of War and Conflict” which looks at the way war has changed and whether we need new tools for the security disputes of the 21st Century. I couldn’t have asked for a more challenging case for us to tackle together.
February 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin began what he called a “special military operation” in Ukraine; most of the world instead have called it a full-scale invasion. Airstrikes were not limited to the separatist regions in the east but have focused on population centers and military bases throughout the country, including the capital city, Kyiv.
So far, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the international security organization created during the Cold War, has not committed to supporting Ukrainians fighting on the ground. Instead, it has offered other types of assistance — money, weapons, vociferous public condemnation and sanctions — but no promise of NATO troops, at least yet.
Why is this happening? Putin’s motives and the historical context do not lead to simple conclusions. I will address what I see are heavily contributing factors in this column.
First, cultural connections dating back centuries are being used by Russia to justify what it views as reunification. Kyiv is seen as the seat of both Ukrainian and Russian identity; Putin believes “Russians and Ukrainians are one people, a single whole.” Despite this, Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union after the Cold War which allowed them to determine for themselves who their allies are and their foreign policy as a whole.
Lately, this includes the widespread desire to increase ties with Western Europe and to join NATO. Russia suggests instead they are being corrupted by and forced to integrate with the West. For Putin, this war aims at gaining lost territory to re-solidify Russia’s political and cultural hold in Eastern Europe.
Second, geostrategic concerns are at the forefront of Russian leaders’ goals. This led to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 that gave them access to an important naval port on the Black Sea and valuable missile sites.
Perhaps more importantly, though, is the closer ties that Ukrainian leaders have been developing with NATO, including talk of membership. I would argue that this desire to join NATO has created a “security dilemma,” a concept in international relations which argues moves by states to increase their security (such as joining a defensive organization) can have unintended consequences.
The opposing party feels less secure and may prompt them to take offensive action, thus leaving the first state in a more precarious position. The former Soviet states of Estonia and Latvia which border Russia, joined in 2004, and should Ukraine do the same, Russia would be surrounded nearly completely by its opposition. While Ukraine desires to maintain its security, it also is creating a motive for Russia to challenge the domestic and foreign policies of its former republic.
Third, this is not the first time in recent years Russia has intervened in Ukrainian affairs. The annexation of Crimea was globally condemned and sanctions were placed on Russia which targeted rich elites. However, sanctions are largely ineffective because they tend to harm populations broadly; it is difficult to pinpoint sanctions which only affect small groups with political influence.
Russia got away with the annexation relatively unscathed and perhaps was inspired to continue the assault on their former territory. Putin seems bent on reasserting Russian domination and has found a window of opportunity. Western states are currently facing multiple crises —a pandemic, economic problems, civil unrest, refugees, political hyperpolarization—to name a few. Publics are likely wary of another international calamity.
I was asked to address the similarities to Nazi expansionism.
Adolph Hitler found Germany in a similar situation during his attempt to conquer Europe. The Allied powers’ unwillingness to stop him due to war weariness is seen as one of the greatest diplomatic blunders of the period. However, that is where such parallels end.
Hitler envisioned the Third Reich’s domination of the world which meant the removal of any peoples who stood in opposition to the master race.
While Putin and Hitler may share the desire for conquest, the goals they seek are different. Russia is pursuing the restoration of its former glory as defined through kinship ties; Nazi Germany sought to destroy all who were not worthy of their “breathing space.”
Fourth, Putin’s hold of Russia may be shakier than it seems. He sometimes enjoys relatively high approval ratings, but this is not consistent, and his rule of Russia often is contested. He first became president in 2000, but since that time, Russian government and politics have moved from politically competitive with democratic rights to an authoritarian-style regime with severe restrictions on things like speech and privacy.
When approval dips, opposition groups often become more vocal. The “Crimea effect” refers to the boost in Putin’s approval ratings after the successful annexation in 2014, reaching more than 80 percent. Since the pandemic, his approval rating has faltered numerous times. COVID-19 numbers have reached record highs in recent weeks while his January approval rating was a mere 29 percent. What better way to reinvigorate his legitimacy than by trying to reunify Mother Russia?
What might happen now?
After the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine strengthened its military, but it still is no match for Russian forces. I suspect Russia will be able to establish stronger controls of eastern Ukraine and may topple Ukraine’s government in Kyiv itself. But military conquest and the ability to rule are two separate issues entirely.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said this week a “new iron curtain” would cut Russia off at the knees. Instead of winning a conventional war, he said the conflict would be won “across Russians’ home.”
U.S. President Joe Biden has said American troops will not see combat in Ukraine but promised increasingly severe diplomatic solution, including completely severing Russia from the global banking system.
While sanctions are generally useless, this may hinder his ability to rule and keep the oligarchs happy.
Almost no countries support Russia’s actions. China has urged for a diplomatic solution. Syria and Venezuela have articulated their support, but these regimes are highly dependent on Russia for military and economic assistance.
Finally, it is easy to say Putin cares nothing for the international order, such as respect for law and sovereignty. But it is noteworthy he even bothers with the pretense of justifying this invasion as anything other than conquest.
Tuesday, he claimed he was sending in “peacekeepers” to assist separatist groups. The story he is “protecting the separatists from Russian aggressors” is false, so why bother with it at all? Why bother talking to Biden and other world leaders? Why bother arguing NATO is out to get Russia?
Being the good guy — having the just cause — depends on justifying one’s actions based on what society will accept. It appears he values his reputation and wants to be remembered as a legitimate leader who brought ethnic Russians home to Mother Russia, not just a strongman bullying weaker opponents to get what he wants.
“The strong do what they can and weak endure what they must,” writes a classical Greek historian. This type of realist thinking explains how Russia can invade Ukraine, but it will not help us predict the outcome. That will depend on the political will of the West.